Also labeled undocumented, irregular, and unauthor-
ized migration, illegal migration places immigrants in
tenuous legal circumstances with limited rights and
protections. We argue that illegal migration emerged as
a structural feature of the second era of capitalist glo-
balization, which emerged in the late twentieth century
and was characterized by international market integra-
tion. Unlike the first era of capitalist globalization (1800
to 1929), the second era sees countries limiting and
controlling international migration and creating a
global economy in which all markets are globalized
except for labor and human capital, giving rise to the
relatively new phenomenon of illegal migration. Yet
despite rampant inequalities in wealth and income
between nations, only 3.1 percent of all people lived
outside their country of birth in 2010. We expect this to
change: threat evasion is replacing opportunity seeking
as a motivation for international migration because of
climate change and rising levels of civil violence in the
world’s poorer nations. The potential for illegal migra-
tion is thus greater now than in the past, and more
nations will be forced to grapple with growing popula-
tions in liminal legal statuses.

Keywords: illegal migration; globalization; unauthor-
ized migration; undocumented migration; climate change; violence

Migration is a fundamental means of human
adaption, commonly used both to avoid
risks and access opportunities. Homo sapiens
emerged in East Africa about 150,000 years ago
and through migration settled the entire globe
within a very short span of geological time,
reaching East Asia and Australia about 50,000
years ago, Northern Europe about 40,000 years
ago, the Americas about 12,000 years ago, and

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the most distant Pacific islands about 2,000 years ago (Oppenheimer 2003). No other organism has moved through space and time so widely or quickly. Humans are a migratory species. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that migration is being widely used by people today to adapt to the unequal distribution of risks and opportunities that prevail in the contemporary world.

Modern times have witnessed three eras of mass human migration, each associated with a period of global economic change. The era from 1500 to 1800 was one of European colonial expansion during which European powers colonized the Americas, Africa, and Asia and created a global mercantile economy based on trade, resource extraction, and the production of valuable commodities. Although European administrators, entrepreneurs, and settlers migrated outward to manage the political and economic affairs of their mercantile empires, the total size of the outflow was not large. By far the largest movement of people during this period was the involuntary transport of some 10 million slaves out of Africa to provide forced labor for European-owned mines and plantations (Klein 1999).

The second stage of mass migration unfolded between 1800 and 1929 and was driven by industrialization in Europe and its spread to a small set of settler nations overseas (O’Rourke and Williamson 1999). This was also the first era of global capitalism, when nearly 50 million people emigrated from the densely populated industrializing nations of Europe to sparsely populated industrializing nations in the Americas and Oceania, with roughly 60 percent going to the United States and the rest scattered mainly among Canada, Argentina, Brazil, Australia, and New Zealand (Massey 1988). This period of mass migration in the first era of global capitalism came to an abrupt halt with the First World War in August 1914, which destroyed massive amounts of land, labor, and capital and left the international order in tatters. Although economic growth, trade, and immigration revived somewhat during the 1920s, they were brought to a definitive end by the market crash of 1929 (Kershaw 2015).

We are currently in the midst of a second era of capitalist globalization (Williamson 2004). Its foundations were laid in the ashes of the Second World War, when the great global powers joined together to create a new set of multilateral institutions that could maintain peace while promoting global trade and investment. The United Nations was created to defuse conflicts and prevent world war, the World Bank to finance economic development, the International Monetary Fund to guarantee international liquidity, and the General Agreement...
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) to lower barriers to cross-border commerce. Over
the course of successive rounds of the GATT, negotiations gradually removed
obstacles to trade and investment, culminating in the creation of the World Trade
Organization in 1995 (Stiglitz 2002).

This current wave of globalization proceeded slowly at first, as the economies
of Europe and Japan were rebuilt after the war; but the pace of change acceler-
ated after 1970 when the digital revolution advanced to create a new, knowl-
edge-based economy. With China’s turn toward the market in 1979 and the collapse
of the Soviet Union in 1991, a truly global economy finally emerged and was firmly
established by the beginning of the new century. Unlike the first era of globaliza-
tion, however, the current era is plagued by a fundamental contradiction.

The Paradox of Twenty-First-Century Globalization

Although human migration is hardly new, undocumented, unauthorized, or ille-
gal migration is a recent phenomenon. The current system of passports and visas
dates only to 1920, when the newly formed League of Nations convened an
international conference to establish standards for passports and guidelines for
their use (Lloyd 2003). Thus, the first era of capitalist globalization unfolded
before the current regime of restrictive migration had been established, and it
was characterized by the relatively free movement of people across international
borders. This openness left markets free to equilibrate transnationally. In addi-
tion to the globalization of markets for capital, land, goods, services, and com-
modities, the labor market was also free to equilibrate globally (Hatton and
Williamson 1998). Although qualitative restrictions on population movements
were implemented in some countries during the nineteenth century, these were
weakly enforced, and strong numerical limits on immigration were not imposed
anywhere until the 1920s.

Today, of course, no nation permits the free entry of immigrants. Indeed, all
nations impose both qualitative and quantitative restrictions on international
migration, thus constraining the globalization of markets for labor and human
capital. This is the fundamental contradiction of postindustrial globalism: nations
today seek to create and participate in a global market in which only some factors
of production are mobile. This paradox has forced policymakers throughout the
world into a Faustian bargain: international factor mobility is encouraged and
facilitated only to the extent that the factors in question lack agency. Under the
terms of this bargain, immigration must be restricted because labor and human
capital are attached to people and people have agency.

The essence of the dilemma is well captured by the Swiss playwright Max
Frisch’s celebrated remark: “We asked for workers. We got people instead.” As
beings with agency, people are problematic. They have needs, make demands,
and ask questions. They seek out others for romance and sex, often producing
babies. If people originate from a foreign country, these exigencies become espe-
cially problematic. In this case, those providing labor and human capital bear
divergent cultures, speak unfamiliar languages, have different values, and generally look at the world in seemingly odd ways, thus increasing the likelihood of misunderstanding and raising the risk of conflict. Foreign workers, in particular, may behave in strange ways that policymakers and the public find perplexing and threatening. And the greater the difference from natives in terms of culture, sociality, and appearance, the more societies perceive immigrants as threatening and believe they must be restricted and controlled.

In today's global economy, we generally observe three levels of international mobility. A very high level of mobility is accorded financial and physical capital, consumer goods, knowledge, information, commodities, and natural resources. Moderate mobility is permitted but regulated for those people who embody forms of capital that are valued and in demand, be it human, social, or cultural capital. Cross-border mobility is limited and tightly controlled, however, for people who lack a valued form of capital, whose principal contribution to economic production is the power of their own labor. As a result, the entry of skilled and highly educated workers linked to investment, trade, and production is permitted and sometimes even encouraged, whereas the entry of mere workers is tightly restricted.

In the twentieth century, the earliest efforts to limit the status of immigrants to that of workers and prevent their recognition as people took the form of "guest worker" programs arranged through international agreements that specified the number of migrants, the length of visits, the conditions of employment, and the end date of any approved period of wage labor. In the United States during the 1950s and early 1960s, for example, the Bracero Program annually imported hundreds of thousands of seasonal workers from Mexico. From the 1950s through the mid-1970s, Western European nations negotiated a series of treaties with nations in Southern Europe, the Middle East, and North Africa that arranged for the temporary entry of many thousands of guest workers to sustain the postwar economic boom in Western Europe. In each case, however, when policymakers attempted to curtail the programs in response to domestic political pressures and economic belt tightening, they discovered that the workers were, in fact, people who often wished to stay, marry, raise families, and participate in their host society as citizens rather than as guests.

Among industrial countries, the United States was first to attempt to curtail its postwar guest worker program. At the end of 1964, the U.S. Congress acted unilaterally to terminate the Bracero Program despite objections from Mexico. Although migrant inflows from Mexico fell abruptly in the immediate aftermath of the program's demise, they quickly resumed without authorization and, by the end of the 1970s, had returned to the peak volumes observed prior to 1964 (Massey and Pren 2012). The rise of undocumented migration gave rise to a new Latino threat narrative in public discourse, since, as "illegal aliens," migrants were by definition "criminals" and "lawbreakers" who menaced American society and had to be stopped (Chavez 2001, 2008), leading to a new politics of immigration restriction and border control that after 1986 resulted in the militarization of the Mexico–U.S. border (Massey, Durand, and Pren 2014).

Through 1985, however, the unauthorized migration that emerged in response to the end of the Bracero Program was heavily circular, with 85 percent of all
illegal entries offset by departures. Unfortunately, after 1986, the rising tide of border enforcement dramatically increased the costs and risks of border crossing, prompting migrants to cease circulating—not by remaining in Mexico but by remaining in the United States after absorbing the rising costs and risks at the border (Massey, Durand, and Pren 2015). In addition, the concentration of enforcement resources at the busiest crossing point in San Diego diverted flows away from California, through the Sonoran desert, into Arizona, and on to new destinations throughout the United States (Massey, Durand, and Malone 2002). Border militarization transformed what had been a circular flow of male workers going to three states into a settled population of immigrant families living in fifty states (Massey, Durand, and Pren 2016).

The Mexico–U.S. case exemplifies well the fundamental contradictions and paradoxes of the current era of globalization. In 1994, Mexico and the United States joined, with Canada, to sign the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which lowered barriers for cross-border movements of capital, goods, services, and information in an effort to create an integrated North American economy. In that same year, however, the United States launched Operation Gatekeeper in San Diego, an all-out militarization of the busiest sector of the Mexico–U.S. border, in an effort to curtail undocumented migration. The buildup of enforcement resources along the border failed to achieve its stated goal and instead increased the net volume of unauthorized migration, accelerating undocumented population growth and spreading migrants more widely throughout the nation (Massey, Durand, and Malone 2002).

During the 1980s, the United States also intervened politically and militarily in Central America to contain Communism in the wake of the 1979 Sandinista Revolution in Nicaragua, yielding a period of intense civil violence, guerilla warfare, and economic dislocation that displaced people throughout the region. Although those fleeing Nicaragua were welcomed in the United States as refugees from communist tyranny, refugees from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras had the misfortune of fleeing right-wing regimes allied with the United States, leading to their label as “economic” rather than “political” migrants (Lundquist and Massey 2005; Massey, Durand, and Pren 2014). As a result, many Central Americans entered without authorization. From 1988 to 2008, the total number of unauthorized residents of the United States grew from 2 million to 12 million, the largest resident population lacking social, economic, and political rights since the end of slavery (Massey 2013). Of the approximately 12 million unauthorized residents, roughly 60 percent were Mexicans and 15 percent Central Americans.

Nations in Western Europe underwent a similar experience when they sought to end their guest worker programs in the wake of the 1973 economic recession. As in the United States, European nations had negotiated binational labor agreements with various source countries to fulfill what were seen as temporary worker shortages in certain industries (Martin 1980). Policymakers viewed temporary migrants as a flexible labor supply that could be imported during periods of high demand and sent home when demand faltered. Few efforts were made to integrate them into the host societies. Instead, they were separated from
native populations and sequestered in poor neighborhoods or employer-provided barracks and initially granted little or no access to social welfare benefits, labor mobility, or family reunification privileges (Castles and Kosack 1973). By 1973, a total of 6.7 million foreigners were employed throughout Western Europe, where they composed about one-seventh of the total labor force (Berger and Mohr 1975).

When the oil boycott of 1973 brought on a worldwide economic recession, nations throughout Europe sought to end temporary worker recruitment and initiate the repatriation of their “guests.” Although guest worker populations in Western Europe indeed fell by around 400,000 in 1974 and 200,000 in 1975, thereafter the number of foreign workers stabilized and the total number of foreign residents began to grow. Instead of returning home, guest workers dug in and stayed for fear of not being able to reenter. As their stays proceeded, they began to apply for the entry of family members from abroad. In West Germany, for example, the foreign workforce dropped by 500,000 persons between 1973 and 1975, but the total foreign population grew by 100,000 (Reichert and Massey 1982). Former guests began to demand the rights of citizens and took advantage of the legal resources of the liberal democracies to bring in dependents and other relatives. In response, immigration policies tightened and enforcement increased along the EU’s external borders, giving rise to new inflows of undocumented migrants.

In the ensuing decades, foreign-born percentages rose throughout Europe, even as the EU expanded to incorporate nations in Southern and Eastern Europe and passage of the 1985 Schengen Agreement guaranteed free cross-border mobility within the EU itself. As various countries were incorporated into the EU, they shifted from the exportation to the importation of labor and became countries of immigration, inevitably producing illegal migrants and making undocumented migration a continent-wide phenomenon.

Table 1 draws on the Clandestino Project (2016) and presents estimates of national, foreign, and undocumented populations in selected EU countries. The figures were compiled on the eve of the Great Recession in 2008 and are estimated with varying degrees of reliability, so they should not necessarily be taken as accurate indicators. For our purposes, we picked the central (median) estimate with the highest quality available rating in the year specified. Given the surge of refugees into Europe between 2014 and 2016, these data are clearly outdated but are presented here to indicate the rough size of immigrant populations in nations that for centuries had been zones of emigration and to reveal the spread of undocumented migration across the European continent early in the twenty-first century.

Foreign populations are generally larger in Western than Eastern Europe, with notably large totals in Germany (6.7 million), Spain (5.5 million), France (3.5 million), Britain (3.4 million), and Italy (2.7 million). Whereas Germany, France, and Britain became labor-importing nations early in the postwar period, Italy and Spain began as labor exporters and only became countries of immigration as the EU consolidated and expanded (Durand and Massey 2010; Martin and Zucher 2008). In proportional terms, immigrants constitute the largest shares of the population in Spain (10 percent), followed by Austria (9.9 percent), Germany (8.2 percent), Greece (7.9 percent), Britain (5.7 percent), and France.
Foreign populations are small in both absolute and relative terms in newer EU nations such as the Czech Republic, Greece, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia. In all cases, however, the figures in Table 1 likely understate the size of the immigrant population, since the figures are based on tallies of foreign nationals rather than all persons born abroad, which is the standard means of defining immigrants in the United States.

Among European nations, former imperial powers generally receive the bulk of their immigrants from ex-colonies. Thus, immigrants to France hail from North Africa, sub-Saharan Africa, and Indochina; those to Britain from South Asia, Africa, and the Caribbean; those to the Netherlands from Indonesia and Suriname; and those to Spain from North Africa and Latin America. Having lost its colonies after the First World War, Germany recruited most of its migrants as guest workers from nations in the Middle East, especially Turkey, but also received immigrants from the Balkans and more recently from Eastern Europe. In the past several years, of course, Greece, Italy, Hungary, Austria, and Germany have emerged as major conduits and destinations for migrants fleeing civil violence, political turmoil, and economic dislocation in the Middle East and North Africa.

All the nations in Table 1 have come to house undocumented populations. Estimates show the greatest numbers in Italy (650,000), Britain (618,000), Germany (325,000), Spain (305,000), and France (300,000). Although they are probably much less reliable, the numbers are much smaller in Eastern Europe, but in some cases the percentage of undocumented among all foreigners appears
to be quite large, as in Poland (91 percent), Slovakia (47 percent), the Czech Republic (31 percent), and Hungary (24 percent). Many unauthorized migrants in Eastern Europe come from former Soviet Republics such as Ukraine and Belarus. Even among larger foreign populations, however, undocumented migrants often account for substantial shares of the total, including 24 percent in Italy, 21 percent in Greece, and 18 percent in Britain. The percentage undocumented has likely been kept down in Spain through a series of regularization programs directed mainly at Latin Americans (Aysa-Lastra and Cachón 2015).

In both North America and Europe, therefore, the consolidation of markets and expansion of international commerce during the current era of globalization have been associated with rising immigration into core nations from the periphery and, inevitably, growing irregular migration. This duality arises from the natural tendency for people to move within integrated, globalizing markets, as clearly occurred during the first era of global capitalism when some 50 million people displaced by industrialization and urbanization in Europe were free to leave for rapidly expanding economies in nations such as the United States, Canada, and Argentina. Freedom of movement allowed transnational labor markets to emerge and equilibrate and, over time, wage differentials between the old and new worlds gradually diminished (Hatton and Williamson 1994).

During this earlier era of capitalist globalization, emigrants from Europe did not relocate randomly but followed avenues of trade, investment, and exchange. A common pattern was the alternation over time of capital flows and immigrant flows from Europe to the Americas (Thomas 1973). Today similar patterns prevail, and migrants continue to move along pathways well established by a shared colonial past; prior guest worker treaties; and ongoing relations of trade, investment, and exchange. The difference today is that immigrant flows are restricted and unable to equilibrate international labor markets because national leaders want to create a global economy with selective factor mobility, a core contradiction finessed by the imposition of ever more repressive controls on the international movement of people.

In a very real way, therefore, illegal migration is built into the structure of the contemporary global economy. Policymakers throughout the world have implemented treaties and trade agreements to integrate markets that ensure the free movement of economic inputs and outputs, with two notable exceptions: labor and human capital. The problem, of course, is that trade and the integration of other global markets create interpersonal connections among people and entail the construction, transportation, and communication networks to connect consumers, producers, and investors in different countries. Over time a social and physical infrastructure invariably arises to reduce the costs of movement between trading nations and increase the diffusion of information between them, leading to migrant flows that cannot be accommodated within today’s restrictive immigration policy regimes. This situation inevitably produces various forms of irregular migration and growing populations that lack full legal status.

Although policymakers, members of the general public, and scholars all commonly treat legal status as a dichotomy, in reality it is more of a continuum extending from the total absence of rights within a host society to the conferral
of the same rights as native citizens, with the number of categories in between varying across time and from nation to nation. In between legal and illegal typically lies a variety of categories characterized by what Menjívar (2006, 1004) calls liminal legality or “the gray areas between documented and undocumented.” The restriction of immigrants’ rights clearly has consequences for their well-being and integration into host societies. Therefore, labor market consequences for illegal migrants is the fundamental topic of this volume.

From Seeking Opportunity to Evading Threats

The bulk of the migration between developing and developed regions in the final decades of the twentieth century and the first decade of the twenty-first century consisted of people moving to take advantage of opportunities. Wages in the Global North were relatively high and employment demand was steady, and people from the Global South moved to increase earnings, diversify income sources, and accumulate savings as part of self-conscious strategies of social and economic mobility. Population movements often began under the auspices of negotiated guest worker arrangements and later continued under increasingly controlled regimes of international movement put in place over time, creating both documented and undocumented immigrants. These developments transpired not only in traditional countries of immigration such as the United States, Canada, Argentina, Australia, and New Zealand, but also in new immigrant-receiving nations such as Britain, Germany, Italy, and Spain (Massey et al. 1998).

Although Western Europe led the way among new immigrant-receiving nations, eventually all nations in the expanded EU switched from the export to import of labor. The rise in oil prices and revenues during the 1970s turned the Persian Gulf into a major importer of labor, and during the 1980s and 1990s the “Asian Tigers” of Japan, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore, and South Korea successively became countries of immigration as their economies matured. As this shift progressed, immigrant populations became more gender balanced because global labor demand targeted both men and women for employment, and policymakers increasingly controlled immigrant entry by employing regulatory systems based on employment and/or marriage (Donato and Gabaccia 2015).

What is perhaps most remarkable about international migration during this period is not that people increasingly moved within a steadily more integrated global economy but that so few people actually left the lands of their birth. Out of 6.9 billion people alive worldwide in 2010, only 214 million were international migrants, composing just 3.1 percent of the earth’s population (United Nations 2011). Therefore, given the pervasive inequalities in wealth and income that prevail between nations, what is most surprising is not how many people became international migrants as globalization spread during the early twenty-first century, but how few did.

There are signs, however, that this relatively benign state of affairs is shifting and that a growing share of migrants in the future will not be moving to access opportunities but to evade threats. Rather than moving to increase earnings,
diversify sources of income, or accumulate savings, they will be seeking to escape immediate threats from civil violence, crime, warfare, family violence, natural disasters, political upheavals, and economic catastrophe—events that often produce a stream of out-migrants whose mobility is motivated by fear. Such people perceive a tangible risk and move rapidly to escape it, usually proceeding to the nearest and most accessible safe haven (Kunz 1973). If they remain within their home nation, they become internally displaced persons; and if they cross an international border, they become refugees or asylees.

Natural disasters, wars, and revolutions have occurred commonly throughout human history to displace people from their homelands and will no doubt continue to do so in the future. Moreover, the structural transformation of the economy during the shift from agrarian to industrial or postindustrial modes of production has long been known to displace people from traditional livelihoods and turn them into migrants (Massey 1988; Sassen 1988). In recent years, however, researchers have begun to pay closer attention to two potential drivers of migration that appear endemic to the twenty-first century: climate change and civil violence.

The term “environmental refugees” was introduced by El-Hinnawi (1985) to describe people forced to leave their place of origin, either temporarily or permanently, because of environmental disruptions triggered by human or natural events. Suhrke (1994) identified desertification, land degradation, deforestation, and rising sea levels as the most important forms of environmental change leading to out-migration; whereas Hugo (2008) lists environmental disasters, environmental degradation, climate change, and disruptions from large-scale human projects as the principal causes. Afifi and Warner (2008) indeed found a positive association between the size of migration flows between 172 countries and measures of overfishing, desertification, water scarcity, soil salinization, deforestation, air pollution, soil erosion, and soil pollution within nations. Thus, we can expect migration to be a common human response to environmental change, as it always has been.

Most studies of environmentally related migration rely on country-specific data rather than cross-national statistical analyses. In their study of migration in Guatemala and the Sudan, for example, Bilsborrow and DeLargy (1991) found that a decline in land productivity fostered rural out-migration, whereas Hitztaler (2004) found that resource-poor villages in Russia’s Kamchatka region displayed greater rates of out-migration than those with stable resource bases. Massey, Axinn, and Ghimire (2010) similarly found that short-distance moves in Nepal were predicted by decreasing access to firewood, declines in agricultural productivity, and decreases in land cover. Bohra-Mishra and Massey (2011a) also found significant effects of population pressure, deforestation, and decreasing agricultural productivity on the likelihood of local mobility in Nepal, but found little evidence that environmental deterioration promoted long-distance migration.

In contrast, estimates derived by Feng, Krueger, and Oppenheimer (2010) suggested a strong relationship between declining crop yields and out-migration from Mexico to the United States; and Munshi (2003) documented a significant connection between the scarcity of rainfall and Mexico–U.S. migration, a connection also observed by Nawrotzki, Riosmena, and Hunter (2012). Donato and
colleagues (2016) similarly found a strong association between lack of rainfall and internal migration in Bangladesh. In an era of global climate change, environmental disruptions carry significant potential to promote movement—clearly short distances but also likely over long distances and even internationally.

In addition to environmental change, another threat common to the contemporary world is civil violence, which emanates from diverse sources, including crime, political terrorism, narco-terrorism, guerilla insurgencies, revolutions, and state-sponsored repression. As with environmental change, aggregate-level studies generally uncover a strong connection between such violence and out-migration. Shellman and Stewart (2007) found that Haitian immigration to the United States was strongly correlated with surges in political violence in Haiti, holding economic conditions constant. Morrison (1993) found similar results in Guatemala, as did May and Morrison (1994) in Colombia. Jones (1989), however, found the effect of violence on migration was mainly indirect, with conflict producing local economic dislocations that, in turn, led to emigration. May and Morrison (1994) also found that conflict-related economic turmoil was more important than violence in predicting migration within Guatemala; but Schultz (1971) showed that the effect of violence on rural-urban migration in Guatemala was small compared to the effects of socioeconomic and demographic factors.

A growing number of investigators have examined the connection between violence and individual and household decisions to migrate. In Colombia, for example, both Engel and Ibáñez (2007) and Ibáñez and Vélez (2008) found that the threat of violence and the presence of paramilitary and guerilla groups were strongly associated with the likelihood of out-migration; and Silva and Massey (2014) have connected rising violence in Colombia to the growth of international migration. Both Lundquist and Massey (2005) and Massey, Durand, and Pren (2014) found that migration from Central America to the United States was strongly predicted by the intensity of the American Contra intervention. In their study of Nepal, Bohra-Mishra and Massey (2011b) found that civil violence had nonlinear effects on migration, such that low to moderate levels of violence reduced the likelihood of movement whereas high levels increased the probability of migration.

We have discussed climate change and violence as two independent threats, each of which potentially contributes to the flow of migrants around the world. Recent work suggests, however, that climate change and civil violence are, in fact, causally interrelated. Indeed, Hsiang, Meng, and Crane (2011) show that outbursts of civil violence are closely tied to variations in the El Niño Southern Oscillation (ENSO). Specifically, they found that the probability of a civil conflict erupting doubles during El Niño versus La Niña years and that the ENSO may have been behind 21 percent of all civil conflicts between 1950 and 2005. Given the potential of climate change to influence the frequency and severity of weather events such as El Niño, climate change not only has the potential to generate migration directly through displacement but also indirectly by triggering civil conflicts in affected areas throughout the world.

These findings contribute to a growing body of research that links international migration to environmental change and civil violence and, possibly, to a dynamic interplay between the two. In contrast to the recent past, therefore,
threat evasion may soon come to dominate opportunity-seeking as the predominant motivation for immigration in the coming decades. Whereas opportunity seeking during the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries produced a relatively small number of immigrants worldwide, threat evasion carries the potential for much larger outflows.

The decision to migrate under threat is more primal than rational. Harsher legal restrictions, enhanced border enforcement, and rising interdictions at sea may be sufficient to deter opportunity-seeking migrants, especially when the costs of movement are balanced against prospective gains that are only theoretical at the time of departure, cannot be foreseen with accuracy, and may or may not materialize in the wake of a move. It is doubtful, however, that the same policies will function as deterrents when the motivation is not a hypothetical gain but a very real, tangible, obvious, and quite immediate threat to the physical and emotional well-being of oneself and one’s family. In this sense, the massive outflow of migrants from Syria, Iraq, and other chaotic zones in the Middle East during summer 2015 may simply be harbingers of greater movements to come as environmental change destabilizes governments and economies and creates immediate threats to well-being in poor nations throughout the world.

Research on Undocumented Migration

Thus, the potential for undocumented migration will, if anything, grow in the future. Understanding how irregular and undocumented migrants adapt and integrate into reluctant host societies while inhabiting tenuous legal statuses is thus a research question of the first order. In this volume, we bring together a series of studies that analyze how legal status affects labor market outcomes, a topic that has been extensively studied to date. It is, however, a question that raises formidable challenges with respect to data collection and analysis, for unauthorized migrants are rarely included in national statistical systems, whether based on censuses, surveys, or administrative databases.

The challenge became evident first in the United States, as undocumented migration from Mexico surged when opportunities for legal entry were curtailed after 1965. In 1978, Douglas Massey began to collaborate with an anthropologist, Joshua Reichert, who had just returned from a year of fieldwork in a rural Mexican village. In the course of his time there, Reichert compiled a notebook divided into sections; each section corresponded to a particular household and listed the basic demographic characteristics of each person living in each household as well as information on the first and last trips to the United States, including documentation. In addition, Reichert had compiled a detailed history of U.S. migration for each male household head and recorded basic information about the household itself, including landholdings, business ownership, home construction, and home amenities.

After seeing the richness of the data, Massey arranged for it to be entered into a computer. He and Reichert collaborated on several articles, using the data to study patterns and processes of migration to the United States. They found that
three-quarters of all households contained migrants and 27 percent contained undocumented migrants (Reichert and Massey 1979, 1980). Impressed with the detail and quality of data on undocumented migration that could be compiled using ethnographic methods, Massey approached a group of Mexican anthropology students, and together they designed a project that combined ethnographic and survey methods to gather data from representative samples of strategically chosen Mexican communities—a methodological approach that came to be known as the ethnosurvey (Massey 1987).

The project was funded in late 1981 by the National Institute of Child Health and Human Development (NICHD), and in summer 1982 the team entered the field to carry out pilot surveys in four communities located in two of Mexico’s top migrant-sending states: Jalisco and Michoacán. These studies ultimately produced a series of journal articles and the book Return to Aztlán (Massey et al. 1987). The success of the pilot effort was used as a springboard to submit a new proposed project to NICHD, to be directed jointly by Jorge Durand and Douglas Massey, that would use ethnosurvey methods to sample four to six Mexican communities each year, to compile over time a cumulative database on documented and undocumented migration to the United States.

That proposal was funded for a five-year period in 1987, launching what became known as the Mexican Migration Project (MMP). The MMP has been continuously funded by NICHD ever since (see Durand and Massey 2004) and was recently renewed to collect data through 2020. Over the years, the project has received supplemental funding from the Hewlett Foundation, the Mellon Foundation, the MacArthur Foundation, and the Russell Sage Foundation, but its principal source of support has always been NICHD. The MMP currently includes samples from 154 communities located in 23 Mexican states and data are made freely available to researchers via the project website,1 which at last count had some 3,900 registered users. The database currently contains information on 25,658 households and 162,293 persons, including 25,918 migrants, 16,644 of whom were undocumented at the time of their last trip.

Given the success of the MMP and the rising migration from the Caribbean, Central America, and South America, in 1998 Durand and Massey submitted another proposal to NICHD to establish the Latin American Migration Project (LAMP), which sought to apply ethnosurvey methods developed by the MMP to communities in other countries throughout Latin America. The LAMP was funded for five years by NICHD and since 2003 has been funded by the MacArthur Foundation. To date, it has compiled survey data from eleven Latin American nations, including seven communities in Costa Rica, fourteen in Colombia, seven in the Dominican Republic, four in Ecuador, four in El Salvador, three in Guatemala, three in Haiti, nine in Nicaragua, two in Paraguay, and five each in Peru and Puerto Rico. Data are publicly available via the project website,2 and at last count roughly 1,600 people had registered as data users.

Since 2000, the MMP investigators have collaborated with interested researchers at other universities throughout the world to launch comparable data collection efforts in other migrant-sending regions, leading to the creation of the China International Migration Project led by Zai Liang at SUNY, Albany; the Polish
Migration Project directed by Frank Kalter at Mannheim University; the Migration from Africa to Europe Project launched by Cris Beauchemin at France’s Institut National d’Études Demographiques; the Bangladesh Environment and Migration Survey developed by Katharine Donato of Vanderbilt University; and the Gender, Migration, and Hispanic Health Project led by Emilio Parrado and Chenoa Flippen at the University of Pennsylvania.

Data collected by these projects form the basis for the studies reported in this volume. Together they address the challenge of studying undocumented migration and assess the effects of undocumented status, examining how illegality affects labor market outcomes among U.S. immigrants and the consequences of unauthorized migration for sending and receiving communities. Fernando Riosmena leads off by situating the MMP’s ethnosurvey design in the broader context of studies on international migration, focusing in particular on the strengths and weaknesses of retrospective life history data and the importance of cross-case, comparative analysis.

Although prospective longitudinal surveys are often considered to be the gold standard for data collection, Riosmena points out that they are not necessarily the best approach when it comes to research on international migration because such surveys cannot readily assess the historical development and evolution of migration streams prior to the survey date. In reality, prospective and retrospective surveys have complementary advantages and disadvantages, a fact recognized by the Polish Migration Project, which combined retrospective data collection with prospective panel data that was gathered from the same people over time. In their analysis, Frank Kalter and Gisela Will cleverly exploit the two sources of data to study how social networks affect Polish labor migration to Germany, taking into account sources of unobserved heterogeneity that are typically left uncontrolled in retrospective event history analyses.

Consistent with their own previous findings and the work of many international migration scholars, Kalter and Will find that access to migration-specific social capital (through connections to people with migrant experience) is critical in predicting the likelihood of migrating from Poland to Germany. They expand knowledge about how social networks influence migration by demonstrating that the most important source of migration-specific capital initially is weak ties to prior German migrants within extended networks of friends and acquaintances. Such ties are instrumental in causing people to consider migration as a viable economic strategy in the first place. Once migration is within the calculus of conscious choice, potential Polish migrants draw on strong ties to facilitate a move to Germany for work.

Another feature of the ethnosurvey approach is parallel sampling—surveying respondents at places of both origin and destination. In his analysis, David Lindstrom refines the sampling procedure of the MMP by gathering information on the location of children of the household head, even those who have formed their own households. This enabled him to develop a new weighting scheme that makes an important distinction between temporary and settled migrants to correct for the underrepresentation of migrants who are more integrated in receiving communities. Pooling together binational data from western Guatemala and
Providence, Rhode Island, he estimates the relative size of the out-migrant settled population in the United States to create sample weights and pooled samples of nonmigrants, return migrants, and settled migrants across the two settings.

Although primarily a methodological analysis, like other articles in this volume, Lindstrom’s data nonetheless reveal how a lack of legal status contributes to the social and economic marginalization of Guatemalan migrants, the vast majority of whom are undocumented. Even after reweighting to improve coverage of more integrated migrants, only 14 percent had a bank account, 19 percent had a credit card, and just half had taxes withheld from their pay. Only 17 percent said they spoke English a little or well, and just 5.5 percent reported having a white friend outside of work.

Following the foregoing methodological works, the remaining articles in the volume draw on various ethnosurvey-based studies to assess the economic situation of undocumented migrants from different countries in various destinations. The first set of studies focuses on Latino migrants in the United States, the largest recipient of immigrants throughout the twentieth century. Jorge Durand, Douglas Massey, and Karen Pren set the tone by documenting how the rise of illegal migration in the early 1970s, and a subsequent shift away from a predictable circular flow combined with continued strong undocumented in-migration, created a situation in which both the net volume of undocumented entries and the population of U.S. unauthorized immigrant residents grew, resulting in approximately 11 million persons now living in the United States without legal status. Their finding of a persistent deterioration in the wages of all Mexicans working in the United States is especially troubling given the failure of the U.S. Congress to reform immigration policy and offer a path for unauthorized migrants to regularize their status and become naturalized citizens.

In addition to the general decline in wages for Mexican immigrants, Durand and colleagues find that undocumented migrants are doubly disadvantaged. Because of their unauthorized status, they are channeled into the secondary labor market where wages are systematically lower than in the primary sector, and they earn lower wages than documented migrants regardless of sector of employment. Moreover, even migrants holding legal visas for temporary work in the United States are significantly disadvantaged in whatever sector they work. Although all Mexican immigrants are disadvantaged in the U.S. labor market, those without documents were more than twice as likely as legal immigrants to work in the secondary sector where wages were substantially lower. The authors estimate that this wage penalty yields an annual deficit of $2,655 for a full-time, year-round worker. Combined with unauthorized migrants’ lower hourly wages and an additional annual deficit of $2,442, estimates suggest $5,097 in total annual income lost. Scaling this loss up across all unauthorized Mexican immigrants in the United States suggests that they bear an extremely high economic penalty, a burden likely to perpetuate poverty and disadvantage over time and into the next generation of American citizens.

In a separate article, Massey, Durand, and Pren build on these findings by combining data from the MMP and the LAMP to analyze how Mexican and non-Mexican Latino immigrants fare in the U.S. labor market. Because the large
majority of Mexican and Central American immigrants today are in undocumented or marginal legal statuses, this analysis is especially important. Despite their higher levels of education and greater socioeconomic standing, non-Mexican Latino migrants—like their Mexican counterparts—have not fared very well in the U.S. labor market. Since the late 1980s, real wages have dropped for both groups. In addition to the wage penalty experienced by undocumented migrants, those who occupied liminal legal categories, such as Temporary Protected Status, also earned lower wages. Thus, the labor market positions of both Mexican and non-Mexican Latino immigrants are disadvantaged, uncertain, and insecure. Such precariousness is cause for great concern in the near future, as Latinos now represent 17 percent of the population and 25 percent of all births in the United States.

In her analysis of the employment and earnings of immigrant Hispanic women, Chenoa Flippen draws on ethnosurvey data collected in the new immigrant gateway of Durham, North Carolina. Although she finds that labor supply of Latina immigrants is driven mainly by family structure and to a lesser extent by human capital, their wages are determined more by legal status than anything else. She estimates that being without documents and concentrated in small firms reduces women’s weekly wages by 25 percent. Furthermore, despite some variation in wages across jobs, approximately 40 percent of her sample reported earning less than the minimum wage. Hispanic immigrant women, therefore, experience multiple sources of disadvantage in the labor market and exist in the shadows in an especially precarious economic situation.

In a second article coauthored with Emilio Parrado, Flippen uses the same ethnosurvey dataset but focuses instead on how the recession and immigration enforcement influence the out-migration of Latino immigrants from Durham. Drawing on multiplicity sampling that relies on respondents’ reports about the mobility of their siblings, they consider whether out-migration shifts over time, what precipitates the move (i.e., family considerations, accidents, economic conditions, or deportations), and whether individuals return to their country of origin or migrate internally to another U.S. destination. Their findings clearly demonstrate the power of the Great Recession: out-migration more than doubled after 2007 and migrants overwhelmingly returned home. Although noneconomic considerations related to families and accidents accounted for the majority of departures before the recession, economic considerations were dominant drivers of out-migration afterward. Migrants from Mexico and those with less human capital were more likely to leave, highlighting the selectivity of out-migration. Interestingly, despite stronger federal enforcement practices during this time, deportations accounted for a negligible share of all moves from Durham. Thus, Latin American migration, especially from Mexico, still involves some circularity, and the negligible effect of deportations as a reason for return suggests that deportations are less effective than voluntary return for regulating the size of immigrant populations.

The second set of articles considers whether and how legal status influences labor market outcomes for non-Hispanic immigrants and in destinations outside the United States. The study from Zai Liang and Bo Zhou considers the economic circumstances of Chinese immigrants in the New York metropolitan labor
market, whereas the analysis from Erik Vickstrom focuses on African immigrants in Europe, and the study by Katharine Donato and colleagues examines whether and how legal status affects the international migration of Bangladeshis and their labor market experiences. These studies, like those in this volume that focus on U.S. immigrants, also reveal that legal status differentiates labor market outcomes, often by penalizing those without documents.

Using ethnosurvey data collected in New York City’s Chinese community in 2004, Liang and Zhou examine the extent to which legal status affects Chinese immigrants’ labor market performance and health status. They focus on five outcomes that are related to legal status of immigrants: wages, hours worked per week, location of employment, self-rated health, and health care utilization. They find that unauthorized immigrants were more likely than legal immigrants to work especially long hours and earn lower wages, and they were also more likely to work in U.S. communities far away from traditional immigrant enclaves in New York City. Undocumented migrants were also less likely than legal Chinese immigrants to use health care and see a doctor when sick.

Vickstrom draws on ethnosurvey data collected in Senegal and Europe to ask why immigrant women, many of whom have legal status, are initially less likely to work than men. He considers whether and how this difference reflects EU policies that create gendered channels of access to labor markets for Senegalese immigrants. He finds a strong association between legal status and employment for Senegalese women but not for men. Of the women who migrate from Senegal to Europe, most do so in a family reunification status that does not necessarily permit employment, and as a result, they are less likely than women in other legal statuses to be economically active upon arrival. Among Senegalese men, however, there is little association between legal status and their economic activity. However, Vickstrom observes that family reunification does not preclude women’s labor market participation over the long term; most women with family-reunification profiles eventually transition into economic activity in their European destinations.

The final study in this volume, by Katharine Donato, Amanda Carrico, Blake Sisk, and Bhumika Piya, considers how legal status is associated with international migration from Bangladesh, a low-lying nation that has experienced dramatic environmental changes in recent decades and high rates of out-migration, which have led to contentious and deadly border conflicts with India. Using new ethnosurvey data collected in 2014 from approximately eighteen hundred households in nine villages, Donato and colleagues’ findings reveal substantial variation by legal status and social capital in the chances of making a first international trip. For example, they report that men’s chances of making an initial international trip by age 44 are highest if they are unauthorized and have a parent or sibling with prior international migrant experience. In addition, undocumented status is linked to fewer hours worked per week, a greater likelihood of using social contacts to find a job, and lower likelihoods of paying taxes or having a bank account in host nations. Thus, even among international migrants from Bangladesh, a nation with large-scale anthropogenic degradation, legal status operates in salient ways to stratify and differentiate the process of international migration.
Lessons Learned

The studies summarized above clearly illustrate that the laws, political narratives, and institutional social structures related to global migration in the early twenty-first century similarly affect the lives of international migrants, whether they originate in nations from which many immigrants seek economic opportunity; or in countries from which many leave to find refuge from conflict, environmental degradation, or other conditions. These studies also suggest that the paradox of twenty-first-century globalization, which created the new phenomenon of illegal migration, has also helped to create inequality among immigrants around the globe. Undocumented immigrants worldwide live and work at a considerable disadvantage, and when compounded by other characteristics, their disadvantage can only worsen the prospects for successful integration in new destinations. If the scale of future international migration grows as more find themselves in nations and communities that are untenable because of rising civil violence or environmental degradation, then the legal status disparities observed here are certain to widen. The mass exodus from the Middle East into Europe that made headlines in summer 2015 is likely a harbinger of things to come.

Notes


References


